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Summary
Considerable controversy surrounds U.S. air passenger prescreening and
terrorist watchlist checks.  In the past, such controversy centered around diverted
international flights and misidentified passengers.  More recently, however, the foiled
conspiracy to bomb airliners bound for the United States from the United Kingdom
(UK) has raised questions about the adequacy of existing processes to prescreen air
passengers against terrorist watchlists.
Observers have noted that the suspected conspirators may have been able to
board aircraft bound for the United States without having been screened against the
consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB) maintained by the U.S. government
prior to the flight’s departure.  Many of those observers have also noted that because
the UK is a participant in the visa waiver program, British nationals are able to visit
the United States temporarily for business or pleasure without acquiring a visa at a
U.S. consular post abroad — a process during which they would be screened against
the TSDB.  Although all ticket purchasers are screened against aviation security
watchlists (the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists) at the point of purchase by
air carriers, some international air passengers may not be screened against the larger,
consolidated TSDB by U.S. border security officials prior to a flight’s departure
(wheels up) if they purchased their tickets just prior to the gates closing on a flight.
In response to the recent plot, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
reportedly issued a temporary order requiring that passenger name records (PNRs)
be provided preflight to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for transatlantic
flights originating in the UK, as opposed to 15 minutes after the flight’s departure as
normally required under current law.  In addition, CBP is seeking greater amounts
of PNR data preflight from all air carriers and to retain that data for a greater length
of time.  U.S. authorities maintain that these measures are necessary to provide
greater aviation and border security.  Some Europeans, however, strongly oppose
such data sharing and view U.S. demands for such data, without data privacy
safeguards, as an infringement on their national and collective sovereignties.
Complicating matters further, in July 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled that
the existing agreement between the European Commission and CBP to exchange
passenger name records was illegal.  The Court ordered the cessation of this data
exchange on September 30, 2006, in the absence of a new agreement that addresses
the Court’s objections with the existing agreement.  If not resolved, this impasse
could significantly affect travel from European Union countries to the United States.
The continuing controversy surrounding U.S. air passenger prescreening
processes and terrorist watchlist checks underscores that screening passengers for
more intensive searches of their person or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding
an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watchlist hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition
for the federal agencies tasked with aviation and border security.  These agencies
include DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and CBP, as well as
the Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
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Introduction
Considerable controversy surrounds U.S. air passenger prescreening processes
and terrorist watchlist checks.  In the past, such controversy centered mainly around
diverted international flights and misidentified passengers; however, the recently
foiled conspiracy to bomb airliners bound for the United States from the United
Kingdom (UK) has raised questions about the adequacy of existing processes to
prescreen air passengers against terrorist watchlists.  This report examines (1)
measures taken in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to improve terrorist
watchlists, (2) U.S. agency efforts underway to better screen air passengers against
those watchlists prior to departure (preflight), and (3) possible issues associated with
maintaining such watchlists and prescreening air passengers, including the
misidentification of persons as terrorists as the result of watchlist checks.
Background: HSPD-6 and Terrorist Screening
In September 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6 (HSPD-6), establishing a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate
the U.S. government’s approach to terrorist screening.1  To this end, certain terrorist
identification and watchlist functions, which were previously performed by the
Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), were
transferred to the newly established TSC and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) — today the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
NCTC and Terrorist Identification
The NCTC serves as the central hub for the fusion and analysis of information
collected from all foreign and domestic sources on international terrorist threats.
Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458),
the NCTC was placed under the newly created Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI).  Prior to this legislation and HSPD-6, however, the nation’s
principal international terrorist watchlist, known as TIPOFF, was maintained by
CRS-2
2 Prior to HSPD-6, INR-generated TIPOFF records were distributed to DOS’s Bureau of
Consular Affairs (CA), as well as to border screening agencies, for inclusion in the Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS), the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS),
and the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). For further
information, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border
Security Options and Issues, by William J. Krouse and Raphael Perl.  See also CRS Report
RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.
3 Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen, “325,000 Names on Terrorism List: Rights Groups Say
Database May Include Innocent People,” Washington Post, Feb. 15, 2006, p. A01.
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Officer of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Review of
the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27, June 2005, p. 49.
5 Under HSPD-6, the FBI is charged with providing domestic terrorist data to the TSC.
6 See CRS Report RL32802, Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and
Counterterrorism, by Bart Elias, William Krouse, and Ed Rappaport.
7 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division, Review of the
Terrorist Screening Center’s Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program, Audit Report
(continued...)
DOS’s INR.2  TIPOFF was transferred to TTIC under HSPD-6.  Based largely on
TIPOFF, the NCTC currently maintains a Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
(TIDE) — designated under HSPD-6 to be the single repository into which all
international terrorist-related data available to the U.S. government will be stored.
According to a press account, the TIDE includes over 325,000 terrorist-related
records.3
TSC and Terrorist Watchlisting and Screening
The TSC is a multiagency collaborative effort administered by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The NCTC shares international terrorist identities
data, which is TIDE-generated, with the TSC.  Combining these data with other
government watchlists, the TSC has established and maintains a consolidated
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).  In addition, the TSC has developed
comprehensive procedures for handling encounters with known and suspected
terrorists and their supporters, and provides terrorist screening authorities with
around-the-clock operational support in the event of possible terrorist encounters.
According to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG), as
of January 2005, the TSDB included nearly 238,000 records.4
The TSC, in turn, distributes TSDB-generated international terrorist lookout
records — along with domestic terrorist lookout records5 — to other screening
agencies.  The TSC, for example, supports the terrorist screening activities of the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as the DOS’s Bureau of
Consular Affairs (CA).  Some aspects of these terrorist screening activities, however,
remain controversial, particularly with regard to misidentifications (false positives).6




05-34, August 2005, p. 26.
8 Public 107-71, Nov. 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 597.
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Aviation Security
System and the 9/11 Attacks, Staff Statement no. 3, Jan. 27, 2004, p. 6.  Available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf].
TSA and CBP and International Air Passenger
 Prescreening Against Terrorist Watchlists
The recent foiled conspiracy to bomb airliners bound for the United States from
the UK has raised questions about the adequacy of existing systems to prescreen air
passengers against terrorist watchlists.  Considerable controversy surrounds air
passenger prescreening processes, underscoring that screening passengers for more
intensive searches of their person or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an
aircraft in the event of a terrorist watchlist hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition
for the federal agencies tasked with aviation and border security.  Today, those
agencies principally include DHS’s TSA and CBP and the FBI-administered TSC.
TSA Air Passenger Screening
The TSA provides the airlines with the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee”
watchlists for use in identifying passengers who are to be denied boarding or who
require additional scrutiny prior to boarding.  The “No Fly” watchlist is a list of
persons who are considered a direct threat to U.S. civil aviation.  Aircraft bombings
in the late 1980s prompted the U.S. government to adopt this list in 1990.  It was
initially administered jointly by the FBI and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
but the FAA assumed sole administrative responsibility for this list in November
2001.  At that time, the FAA instituted the “Automatic Selectee” list as well.  As the
names of these lists imply, prospective passengers found to be on the “No Fly” list
are denied boarding and referred to law enforcement, whereas those on the
“Automatic Selectee” list are selected for secondary security screening before being
cleared to board.
Under the Aviation Transportation Security Act,8 TSA was established and
assumed the administrative responsibility for these lists.  As the FAA did before it,
the TSA distributes these watchlists to U.S. air carriers.  In turn, the air carriers
screen passengers against these watchlists before boarding.  In general, these lists are
downloaded into a handful of computer reservations systems used by most U.S. air
carriers; however, a few smaller carriers still manually compare passenger data
against these lists.  As intelligence and law enforcement officials were concerned
about the security of the “No Fly” list, only a handful of names were listed prior to
the 9/11 attacks (fewer than 20).9  Since then, the lists have been expanded almost
CRS-4
10  Electronic Privacy Information Center, “‘Documents Show Errors in TSA’s ‘No Fly’
Watchlist,” April 2003, at [http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist_foia_
analysis.html].
11 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division, “Terrorist Screening Center Consolidates Data for Law
Enforcement Needs,” The CJIS LINK, vol. 7, no. 4, October 2004, pp. 1-2.
12 Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Faulty ‘No Fly’ System Detailed,” Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2004,
p. A01.
13 Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Committee Chairman Runs Into Watch-List Problem:  Name
Similarity Led to Questioning at Anchorage and Seattle Airports, Alaska Congressman
Says,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2004, p. A17; and “Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials:
Some Ended Hassles at Airports by Making Slight Change to Name,” Washington Post,
Aug. 21, 2004, p. A08.
daily.10  Within TSA, the Office of Intelligence is responsible for resolving potential
watchlist matches.
According to the FBI, the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists were
consolidated into the TSC’s TSDB sometime in the latter half of FY2004.11  While
much larger, these watchlists still appear to be a relatively small subset of the TSDB.
It has been reported that by the end of FY2004, there were more than 20,000 names
on the “No Fly” list and TSA was being contacted by air carriers as often as 30 times
per day with potential name matches.12  During 2004, the “No Fly” and “Automatic
Selectee” lists were the subject of increased media scrutiny for misidentifications.
In some cases, these misidentifications included Members of Congress (e.g., Senator
Edward Kennedy and Representatives John Lewis and Don Young).13
It is notable that because not all known and suspected terrorists are considered
“threats to civil aviation,” there could be legal and investigative policy considerations
that would bear upon placing all such persons, who are included in the TSDB, on the
“No Fly” list and possibly the “Automatic Selectee” list.  The TSC, moreover, may
be reluctant to release the full list of known and suspected terrorists to the airlines
because of data security concerns.  Although data security remains a concern, a much
larger terrorist watchlist is provided by the TSC to CBP.  This watchlist, however,
remains under government control.
CBP Air Passenger Prescreening
Air passengers on inbound and outbound international flights are also screened
by CBP with border security systems that include a much larger subset of the TSDB-
generated terrorist lookout records than those included in the “No Fly” or “Automatic
Selectee” lists.  Even before the 9/11 attacks, limited amounts of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data were transferred to CBP predecessor agencies (the U.S. Customs
Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service) for incoming international
flights.  As it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, such data are transferred to CBP from air
carriers through the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), which runs on
CRS-5
14 APIS was developed in 1988 by the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.  Although the electronic submission of passenger manifests through
APIS was voluntary at first, most air carriers submitted their manifest electronically prior
to the 9/11 attacks.  Following those attacks, Congress included provisions requiring the
electronic submission of manifests in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L.
107-71) and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
173).
15 U.S. Department of State, TIPOFF, CLASS, IBIS, CT-LINK slide show presentation, Oct.
6, 2002, available at [http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/TIPOFF.pdf].  U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Statement for the Advance Passenger
Information System (APIS), Mar. 21, 2005, p. 6, available at [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/
assetlibrary/privacy_pia_cbpapis.pdf].
16 For further information, see CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, by Lisa M. Seghetti and Stephen R. Viña.
17 As described more fully below, the Court ruled that the agreement was illegal and ordered
that the exchange of PNR data should cease on September 30, 2006, if a revised agreement
has not been negotiated.
18 Martial Tardy and Adrian Schofield, “Court Scraps European Union-U.S. Data
Agreement,” Aviation Daily, May 31, 2006, vol. 364, no. 42, p. 1. 
19 Ibid.
the legacy Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).14  PNR data are
compared with several watchlists that reside on the Interagency Border Inspection
System (IBIS), including the TSDB-generated terrorist watchlist.15
In addition, PNR data are linked to other immigration inspections systems
(including biometric data) as part of the US-VISIT program — the ultimate objective
of which is to record the entry and exit of every noncitizen to and from the United
States.16  In the future, such data linkages and corresponding interagency information
sharing could be useful to intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not only
“connecting the dots,” but for interdicting known or suspected terrorists at our
borders as well.
Passenger Name Record Data.  In FY2004, CBP sought greater amounts
of PNR data from European airlines.  Negotiations over acquiring such data were
“highly publicized,” and U.S. authorities threatened to fine the European airlines for
not providing such data.  In May 2004, an interim agreement was negotiated with the
European Commission, under which CBP has been provided with 34 specific
categories of PNR data for travelers on international flights from European Union
(EU) countries.  In June 2004, however, the European Parliament challenged this
agreement with an “action of annulment” in the European Court of Justice.17  In May
2006, the European Court of Justice ruled that the existing agreement between the
European  Commission and CBP was illegal.18  The Court ordered the cessation of
this data exchange on September 30, 2006, if a new agreement has not been reached
that addresses the Court’s objections with the existing agreement.19
Diverted International Flights.  Under current practice, PNR data are
transferred through CBP’s APIS several times prior to departure as it becomes
CRS-6
20 See David Leppard, “Terror Plot To Attack US with BA Jets,” Sunday Times (London),
Jan. 4, 2004, p. 1; Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Cat Stevens Held After DC Flight Diverted,”
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2004, p. A10; and  “US-Bound Air France Flight Diverted Due
to Passenger,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 2004.
21 Niraj Warikoo, “Doctor Says He’s Profiled At Airports: Beverly Hills Man Joins Class
Action vs. Government,” Detroit Free Press, June 20, 2006.  Jeff Coen, “ACLU Expands
Profiling Lawsuit,” Chicago Tribune, June 20, 2006, p. C6. 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, “TSA
To Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System” (Washington, Aug. 26, 2004), 2 pp. 
23 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11, Subject:
Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures (Washington, Aug. 27, 2004),
available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-7.html].
24 P.L. 108-458, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3638.
available to the airlines; however, final PNR data are sometimes not transferred
through APIS until after the flight has departed (wheels up).  In several recent cases,
known and suspected terrorists have been allowed to board aircraft at airports abroad
and, subsequently, this led to costly diversions when air carriers were prevented from
entering U.S. airspace or continuing to their destinations.  Several of these incidents
have generated significant press coverage.20  CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC)
confers with TSC representatives to resolve potential watchlist matches.
Air Passenger Misidentifications.  Despite close cooperation between
CBP’s NTC and the FBI-administered TSC, as has been the case for TSA and
domestic flights, CBP misidentifications on international flights have also generated
some controversy.21  Despite these difficulties, the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) made several recommendations
to increase such data sharing and strengthen air passenger prescreening against TSC-
maintained watchlists.  Some of these were reflected in provisions that Congress
included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458).
The air passenger prescreening provisions in this law are discussed generally below.
9/11 Commission Final Report and Air Passenger
 Prescreening
In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission made air passenger prescreening- and
terrorist travel-related findings and recommendations in its final report.  Shortly
thereafter, the TSA unveiled the “Secure Flight” domestic air passenger prescreening
program,22 and the Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive
11 (HSPD-11), calling for “comprehensive terrorist-related screening procedures.”23
Later, in December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004,24 a law that included several provisions that authorized the
NCTC and built upon earlier efforts already undertaken under HSPD-6 to better
CRS-7
25 For further information, see CRS Report RL32802, Homeland Security: Air Passenger
Prescreening and Counterterrorism, by Bart Elias, William Krouse, and Ed Rapport.
26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, (Washington, 2004), p. 385.
27 The Intelligence Community includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National
Security Agency (NSA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (GIA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the other DOD
offices that specialize in national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the
intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the FBI, the
Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; the INR at the DOS, the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis at Department of the Treasury, and elements of the DHS that are concerned
with the analyses of foreign intelligence information (50 U.S.C. §401a(4)).
28 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Three 9/11 Hijackers:
Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking,” Staff Statement no. 2, (Washington, 2004), p.
1.
29 The 9/11 Commission Final Report, p. 385.
30 Ibid., p. 387.
31 Ibid., p. 393.  Also, for further information, see CRS Report RS21920, Detection of
Explosives on Airline Passengers:  Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Related
Issues, by Dana Shea and Daniel Morgan.
32 Ibid., p. 393.
screen known and suspected terrorists, particularly in regard to advanced
prescreening of airline passengers.25
Integrated Terrorist Travel Strategy
Among other things, the 9/11 Commission concluded that disrupting terrorist
travel was as powerful a weapon as targeting their money.26  The 9/11 Commission
found, however, that prior to the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community27 did not
view watchlisting as integral to intelligence work.28  To prevent future terrorist
attacks, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States expand terrorist
travel intelligence and countermeasures,29 and that the U.S. border security systems
be integrated with other systems to expand the network of screening points to include
the nation’s transportation systems and access to vital facilities.30
To increase aviation security, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the
Congress and TSA give priority to screening passengers for explosives.31  At a
minimum, the 9/11 Commission recommended that all passengers referred to
secondary screening be thoroughly checked for explosives.32  Arguably, this
necessitates a robust process to carefully select only those passengers believed to
pose the greatest risk to aviation security, while minimizing false positives.  To better
screen air passengers, the 9/11 Commission recommended that
! the “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” watchlists used to screen air
passengers be improved without delay;
CRS-8
33 Ibid.
34 Jonathan Alter, “Plugging Holes in the Skies: The Terrorists Used Airplanes as Weapons
in 9/11.  So Why Haven’t We Made Travel Safer by Now?” Newsweek, Aug. 21-28, 2006,
p. 50.
35 CAPPS II was originally designed to use sophisticated algorithms to search both
government and commercial databases to acquire limited background information on ticket
buyers to authenticate their identity and look for irregularities in behavioral patterns that
might suggest that they could pose a risk.  Critics, however, decried the cloak of secrecy
under which TSA developed CAPPS II and argued that the potential loss of privacy under
such a system would not be counterbalanced with a corresponding increase in security.  See
Jill D. Rhodes, “CAPPS II: Red Light, Green Light, or ‘Mother, May I?’” The Homeland
Security Journal, March 2004, p. 1.  For further discussion of CAPPS II and other aspects
of air passenger prescreening, see CRS Report RL32802, Homeland Security: Air Passenger
Prescreening and Counterterrorism.
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, TSA to
Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System, (Washington, Aug. 26, 2004), 2 p.  
! the actual screening process be transferred from U.S. air carriers to
TSA;
! air passengers be screened against the larger set of U.S. government
watchlists (principally the TSDB); and
! air carriers be required to supply the needed information to test and
implement air passenger prescreening.33
As described below, both the Administration and Congress acted to implement the
9/11 Commission’s recommendations and establish an integrated strategy to disrupt
terrorist travel, but the results to date have been mixed, and some observers believe
that some aviation security issues have not yet been adequately addressed.34
Efforts To Improve Air Passenger Prescreening
Prompted in part by the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, the TSA
unveiled plans to discontinue the development of the controversial Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II)35 in favor of the test program
dubbed “Secure Flight.”36
TSA Secure Flight Program.  According to TSA, the Secure Flight program
was being designed to better deter, detect, and prevent known or suspected terrorists
from boarding commercial flights.  The TSA endeavored to meet this objective by
using Secure Flight as a means to focus its limited screening resources on individuals
and their baggage who are perceived to pose an elevated or unknown risk to
commercial aviation, while reducing the number of passengers screened and wait
times at passenger screening checkpoints.  According to TSA, Secure Flight
consisted of four elements:
! a streamlined rule for more intensive screening,
! a scaled-back identity authentication process,
CRS-9
37 Sec. 518, 119 Stat. 2085.
! a passenger name check against the Terrorist Screening Database,
and
! an appeals process for passengers who may have been misidentified.
In addition to the appeals process, the Secure Flight program is an amalgam of
features taken from existing screening systems, CAPPS II, and the 9/11
Commission’s recommendations that passengers be screened against the wider set
of terrorist watchlists maintained by the U.S. government.  Within TSA, the Office
of National Risk Assessment has responsibility for establishing policy for the Secure
Flight program.
Domestic and International Screening.  To reduce redundant or
overlapping passenger processing systems, it appeared that Secure Flight would be
used only for prescreening passengers on domestic flights.  DHS’s CBP would be
responsible for checking passenger identities against watchlists and prescreening
passengers on inbound and outbound international flights.  It is unclear, however,
whether responsibility for screening domestic and international flights can be clearly
divided between TSA and CBP, because many international flights have domestic
legs and international passengers sometimes make connections to domestic flights.
It is also unclear, moreover, whether the development of Secure Flight will
impair entirely TSA’s responsibility for screening international air passengers who
may be threats to civil aviation.  At issue is TSA’s authority and responsibility over
all aspects of aviation security versus CBP’s authority and responsibility for border
management and security.  Presently, the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists are
used by air carriers to screen passengers on international and domestic flights.  It
remains an open policy question whether this prescreening mechanism will be
replaced by CBP pre-departure screening of air passengers on all in-bound
international flights.  In the case of international air travel, the distinction between
aviation and border security functions has become increasingly blurred.
Related Provisions in the Intelligence Reform Act.  Congress,
meanwhile, included air passenger prescreening-related provisions in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) that require (1) TSA to assume
the airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes
an advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that uses the
consolidated TSDB (described as a domestic corollary system to US-VISIT); (2) CBP
to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure;
and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons who are identified as
security threats may challenge such determinations.
Related Appropriation Rider.  Also, in the FY2006 DHS Appropriations
Act (P.L. 109-90), Congress prohibited TSA from spending any appropriated funds
on the deployment of Secure Flight, or any successor system, until the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports that certain conditions have been met, including
the establishment of an appeals process.37
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Problems Developing Secure Flight.  Like its predecessor, CAPPS II, the
Secure Flight program has proven controversial.  In March 2005, the DHS OIG
reported that  TSA had mishandled some passenger data while testing CAPPS II, but
since that time, the agency’s approach to privacy issues had improved markedly.38
In the same month, the GAO reported that TSA had begun developing and testing
Secure Flight; however, TSA had not determined fully “data needs and system
functions,” despite ambitious timelines for program implementation.39  Consequently,
the GAO reported that it was uncertain whether TSA would meet its August 2005
Secure Flight operational deployment date.40  The TSA, in fact, did not meet the
deadline and in February 2006 announced that it was restructuring (“rebaselining”)
the Secure Flight program.
In addition, in July 2005, GAO reported that TSA had not fully disclosed its use
of passenger data during the testing for Secure Flight.41  In August 2005, moreover,
DOJ OIG reported that there were numerous problems coordinating the development
of the Secure  Flight program with the efforts of the FBI-administered TSC.42  In
September 2005, the identity authentication element of the Secure Flight program,
under which TSA planned to compare PNR data (for domestic flights) with databases
maintained by commercial data aggregators to verify passenger identities, was
reportedly dropped.43
TSC Operations and Support for Secure Flight
Regarding TSC operations and support for the Secure Flight program, the DOJ
OIG issued two audits in the summer of 2005.  Congress, meanwhile, provided the
TSC with increased funding to support the Secure Flight program, among other
terrorist screening initiatives.  Nevertheless, TSA has encountered difficulties in
adequately developing the program, and its implementation was indefinitely
postponed in February 2006.
CRS-11
44 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should
Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO Report GAO-03-322
(April 2003).
45 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Review of the
Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27, (Washington, June 2005), 160 pp.
46 Ibid., p. 6.
47 Statement of Donna A. Bucella Director, Terrorist Screening Center, before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on Passport
Vulnerabilities, Washington, June 29, 2005,  p. 2.
48 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Terrorist
Screening Center’s Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program, Audit Report 05-34,
(Washington, Aug. 2005), 41 pp.
49 U.S. Department of Justice, 2006 Congressional Authorization & Budget Submission, vol.
II, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Washington, Febrary 2005), pp. 3-33.
50 Ibid.
Inspector General Audit of TSC Operations
In June 2005, DOJ OIG issued an audit, reporting that the TSC had established
a single consolidated TSDB, as recommended by GAO,44 but with some difficulties.45
Among other things, the TSDB had not been completely audited to ensure that its
records were complete and accurate.  The OIG also reported that the NCTC was
using TIPOFF as the principal source of lookout records for international terrorists,
and the TIDE was slated to be brought online in mid-2005.46  During a Senate hearing
on passport fraud, the TSC Director, Donna Bucella, testified that the TIDE had been
“incorporated” into the TSDB.47
NCTC Support of TSC Watchlisting.  An oversight issue for Congress —
some may maintain the most critical issue — is whether the Intelligence Community
is sharing reliable information with the NCTC that is necessary to effectively identify
known and suspected terrorists and their supporters.  Because TIDE-generated
records are the principal source of watchlist records on international terrorists, this
issue undergirds the TSC’s ability to accomplish its mission.  To date, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence OIG has not reported an audit of the NCTC’s
support of the TSC, nor is it publically known whether the NCTC has evaluated the
TIDE for accuracy and comprehensiveness.
Anticipated FY2006 TSC Support for Secure Flight
In August 2005, the DOJ OIG issued an audit of the TSC’s support for the
Secure Flight program, reporting that such support would significantly increase the
TSC’s workload.48  The FBI-administered TSC anticipated that supporting the Secure
Flight program and other terrorist screening initiatives would increase the number of
possible terrorist encounters by 500% in FY2006, compared with its estimated
FY2005 workload.49  The Administration had requested $75 million to fund an
additional 61 positions for the TSC as part of the overall FBI request,50 bringing the
total FY2006 request for the TSC to nearly $99 million, according to the DOJ OIG.
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Of the latter amount, the OIG reported that about 40% was either directly or
indirectly attributable to the TSC’s anticipated support of TSA’s Secure Flight
program.
The FY2006 Science-State-Justice-Commerce appropriations bill (H.R. 2862)
included conference report language that earmarked a $70 million increase for the
TSC to fund an additional 61 positions.51  With this increased funding, the TSC was
in a position financially to support the Secure Flight program.  In February 2006,
however, GAO testified before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee that TSA still faced significant program development challenges.  Shortly
thereafter, the TSA put Secure Flight on hold so that the program could be redesigned
(rebaselined).52
Emerging EU-U.S. Data Sharing Issues
More recently, the issue of PNR data sharing has reemerged as a problem for the
United States, as the European Court of Justice has ruled a EU-U.S. PNR data
sharing agreement to be illegal and ordered a cessation of such data sharing on
September 30, 2006.  In light of a recently foiled plot to bomb airliners flying from
the UK to the United States, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff has proposed that the
United States should acquire greater amounts of PNR data to better screen for known
and suspected terrorists.53
European Court of Justice Ruling
In May 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of an “action of
annulment” requested by the European Parliament in regard to the legality of an
agreement made by the European Commission and CBP to exchange passenger name
records to better screen for terrorists boarding transatlantic flights.54  Although the
European Commission has been working with CBP to renegotiate this agreement in
terms that will not be objectionable to the European Parliament or Court of Justice,
the sharing of these data under the annulled agreement is to cease on September 30,
2006.55  If not resolved, this impasse between the U.S. and EU authorities with regard
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to PNR data sharing may significantly affect travel from EU countries to the United
States.
CBP Seeks Greater Passenger Data
In July 2006, CBP published a notice of proposed rulemaking, in which the
agency seeks to acquire PNR data (complete manifests) 60 minutes prior to
departure, with a mechanism that would allow for individual, real-time transactions
up to 15 minutes prior to a flight’s departure for last-minute ticket buyers and other
manifest changes.56  In part, U.S. authorities maintain that such advanced information
is necessary for prescreening noncitizens traveling to the United States under the visa
waiver program, as well as long-term, multiple-entry visa holders, because they are
not screened at a U.S. consulate abroad as part of a visa issuance process.57
Following the recent foiled conspiracy to bomb several airliners flying from
Britain to the United States, observers noted that the suspected conspirators could
have boarded the aircraft bound for the United States without having been screened
against the international terrorist watchlists maintained by the TSC in the TSDB prior
to a flight’s departure, because the UK is a participant in the visa waiver program.
In response to this, DHS has reportedly issued a temporary order requiring that
passenger name records be provided preflight to CBP for transatlantic flights
originating in the UK,58 as opposed to 15 minutes after a flight’s departure as
normally required under current CBP regulations (for arrival manifests).59
Furthermore, CBP reportedly announced recently that it will seek to obtain greater
amounts of air passenger data preflight from all air carriers and retain that data
longer.60  Reportedly, some Europeans strongly oppose such data sharing and see
U.S. demands for such data, without stronger data privacy safeguards, as an
infringement on their national and collective sovereignties.61
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Misidentifications and Related Procedures
Misidentifications have been a recurring issue for Congress. Initially, such
problems were frequently associated with TSA’s administration of the “No Fly” and
“Automatic Selectee” lists. More recently, however, this may be an emerging
problem for CBP as well in light of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
class-action suit against that agency.62
Under HSPD-6, the TSC Director has been made responsible for developing
policies and procedures related to the criteria for including terrorist identities data in
the consolidated TSDB and for measures to be taken in regard to misidentifications,
erroneous entries, outdated data, and privacy concerns.  The Administration
maintains further that since the TSC does not collect intelligence, and has no
authority to do so, all intelligence or data entered into the TSDB are actually being
collected by other agencies in accordance with applicable, pre-existing authorities.
At the same time, however, the TSC is limited in its ability to address certain
issues related to misidentifications because it is restricted from divulging classified
or law enforcement-sensitive information to the public under certain circumstances
(discussed below).  The same could be said for many screening agencies as well (e.g.,
TSA and CBP), because many terrorist lookout records, while possibly declassified,
are based on classified intelligence collected by other agencies.  Hence, questions
could arise as to which agencies, if any, are in a  position to handle matters pertaining
to misidentifications.  Moreover, if procedures are not properly coordinated,
inconvenienced travelers who have been misidentified as terrorists or their supporters
could face a bureaucratic maze if they attempt to seek redress and remedy.
The OIG audit on TSC operations, meanwhile, included a recommendation that
the TSC strengthen procedures for handling misidentifications and articulate those
procedures formally in written documents (operational guidelines).63  Although
formal internal procedures for receiving and processing redress matters have been
reportedly established at the TSC, there have been no public reports outlining and
evaluating those procedures since the OIG audit.64  In developing those procedures
further, the TSC and other screening agencies may encounter several significant
statutory hurdles as well.
Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act
In regard to TSC, Members of Congress and other outside observers have
questioned whether there should be new policy and procedures at different levels
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(such as visa issuance, border inspections, commercial aviation security, domestic
law enforcement, and security of public events) for the inclusion of persons in the
TSDB.65  Also, Members have asked how a person could find out if they were in the
Terrorist Screening Database and, if so, how they got there.  In congressional
testimony, TSC Director Bucella surmised that a person would learn of being in the
TSDB when a screening agency encountered them and, perhaps, denied them a visa
or entry into the United States, or arrested them.  Director Bucella suggested that the
TSC would probably be unable to confirm or deny whether the person was in the
TSDB under current law.66
Consequently, persons who have been identified or misidentified as terrorists
or their supporters would have to pursue such matters through the screening agency.
The screening agency, however, might not have been the originating source of the
record,  in which case a lengthy process of referrals may have to be initiated.  Under
such conditions, persons identified as terrorists or their supporters may turn to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Privacy Act as a last alternative.  Under
FOIA,67 any person, including a noncitizen or nonpermanent resident, may file a
request with any executive branch agency or department, such as the State
Department or DHS, for records indicating they are on a watchlist.  However, under
national security and law enforcement FOIA exemptions, the departments may
withhold records on whether an individual is on a watchlist.68  Consequently, a FOIA
inquiry is unlikely to shed any light on these areas.
In addition, a citizen or legal permanent resident may file a Privacy Act69 request
with DHS and/or DOJ to discern whether a screening agency or the FBI has records
on them.  However, the law enforcement exemption under the Privacy Act may
permit the departments to withhold such records.  Under the Privacy Act, a citizen
or legal permanent resident may request an amendment of their record if information
in the record is inaccurate, untimely, irrelevant, or incomplete.  Under both FOIA and
the Privacy Act, there are provisions for administrative and judicial appeal.  If a
request is denied, the citizen or legal permanent resident is required to exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in U.S. District Court to challenge
the agency’s action.
Other Possible Legal Questions
The Administration has pledged that terrorist screening information will be
gathered and employed within constitutional and other legal parameters.  Although
the Privacy Act generally does not restrict information sharing related to known and
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suspected terrorists who are not U.S. persons for the purposes of visa issuance and
border inspections, it does restrict the sharing of information on U.S. persons
(citizens and legal permanent residents) for purely intelligence purposes, who are not
the subject of on-going foreign intelligence or criminal investigations.70
Consequently, legal questions concerning the inclusion of U.S. persons on various
watchlists under criminal or national security predicates may arise.  In addition,
questions of compensation for persons damaged by mistaken inclusion in these
databases will likely be an issue.
Possible Issues for Congress
Four issues loom large in terms of the U.S. government’s capabilities to identify,
screen, and track terrorists and their supporters.  For example, how reliable is the
intelligence that is the basis for lookout records?   How accurate and complete is the
consolidated terrorist screening database itself?  When will the TSA and CBP be able
to effectively prescreen air passengers prior to departure? Will the TSC in
cooperation with  screening agencies be able to establish viable redress and remedy
processes for persons misidentified as terrorists or their supporters given certain
limitations placed on those agencies in regard to the public divulgence of national
security and law enforcement sensitive information?
Reliability of Intelligence Underlying Lookout Records
Because the terrorist identities database (TIDE) maintained by the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the principal source of lookout records on
international terrorists placed in the TSC’s consolidated terrorist screening database,
a key oversight issue for Congress is whether the intelligence community is sharing
the appropriate information necessary to effectively identify terrorists and their
supporters with the NCTC.  Is the TSC receiving timely terrorist identities data
updates that reflect the best and most reliable intelligence available to intelligence
and law enforcement agencies?
Accuracy and Completeness of the Terrorist Screening 
Database
According to the DOJ OIG, the TSC struggled to develop a consolidated
terrorist screening database, as illustrated by the several versions of this database
referenced in the OIG audit and numerous problems associated with the database.
Among other things, the problems included data inaccuracies, omitted and
unactivated fields, and duplicate records in two early versions of this database.
Although the TSC did manage to upload terrorist lookout records into the National
Crime Information Center’s system, so that it would be available to state, local, and
tribal police for the first time, another issue may be whether there was a degradation
in the quality of lookout records provided to other mainline screening agencies, such
as the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS’s Customs and
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Border Protection.  Consequently, an issue for Congress may be whether the TSC
was able to maintain the same quality of lookout records that were provided
previously by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as there
may be outstanding issues related to the accuracy and completeness of the lookout
records in the consolidated terrorist screening database.
Preflight Passenger Screening by TSA and CBP
While largely related to implementation, a number of unresolved questions
remain with regard to prescreening air passengers prior to departure (wheels up).
How quickly can TSA develop and deploy an advanced air passenger prescreening
system that, among other things, will assume the day-to-day administration of the
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” watchlists from the airlines?  Will DHS and CBP
be able to negotiate an agreement with the EU for a greater amount of PNR data that
would be provided preflight?  If such an agreement cannot be reached, what will the
implications be if DHS and CBP require such data through new regulations
(administratively) and subsequently refuse non-compliant air carriers entry into the
United States or fine them for not providing such data preflight?
Viable Processes of Redress and Remedy for 
Misidentifications
Concerning misidentifications, under HSPD-6, the TSC Director is responsible
for developing policies and procedures related to the criteria for inclusion into the
consolidated TSDB, and for taking measures to address misidentifications, erroneous
entries, outdated data, and privacy concerns.  An issue for Congress may be the
extent to which the TSC is working with screening agencies to develop appropriate
and effective redress and remedy processes for persons misidentified as terrorists or
their supporters.  Given certain limitations placed on the TSC and screening agencies
with regard to releasing national security and law enforcement sensitive information,
will sufficient information channels be available and remedial processes established
to provide for accurate and expeditious determinations in misidentification cases?
